Return on assets in the Tobacco Industry analysis of the four main Tobacco Manufacturers

This paper studies operating profitability drivers in the Four Main Tobacco Manufacturers for the period 2004-2014. The operating profitability is analyzed as return on assets (ROA) based on the DuPont Extended Model breakdown in degree of operational risk, gross sales margin and assets turnover. The sources of ROA are market share and price strategies appraised through the drivers: firm-size, global value and strategic choices. Using consolidated data, results suggest that firm-size and global value holds a positive relationship with ROA. Also innovation through less harmful tobacco products can lead to better ROA despite no correlation between R&D and ROA.

Does cigarette promotion increase susceptibility to smoking? : a re-test of the link between tobacco industry promotion and adolescent susceptibility to cigarette use

In 1998, using the Index of Receptivity to Tobacco Industry Promotion (IRTIP), it was claimed that tobacco promotion increased youth susceptibility to smoking. Arguably, this claim started the belief that ?cigarette advertising causes smoking? and led to many countries severely restricting cigarette promotion. The problem is, ten years lat... more »er, youth are still lighting up. Could they have gotten it wrong? The IRTIP procedure is widely used to model the link between promotional activities and susceptibility to product use. It is now being used for other products like alcohol, fast-food and colas. This book reports the results of a verification and re-test of the IRTIP model. Using the original data, it was found that IRTIP magnifies Response-Style and Respondent Drop-Out Biases. These biases are shown to lead to the finding of a positive link between tobacco promotion and susceptibility to smoking. Because the IRTIP process is biased, it may be prudent to revisit the many research studies that have used this procedure. The faulty 1998 claim may have harmed efforts to control and limit the use of cigarettes.

Questioning the construct of 'susceptibility' in the causal link between tobacco industry promotion and adolescent smoking

The first article to report on a causal connection between tobacco industry promotion and adolescent smoking (Pierce et al. 1998) had, and continues to have, a significant influence on the marketing of cigarettes in many parts of the world. A key construct in determining causality was the ability to identify the respondents’ “susceptibility to smoke”. Through an analysis of the questions, and reanalysis of the original data used by Pierce et al. (1998), it is shown that the construct is flawed, and needs revision before a causal link can be claimed with the original data.

How well does the index of receptivity to tobacco industry promotion discriminate between smoking and never smoking adolescents.

Tobacco advertising is often named as the culprit that causes children to start smoking (Lancaster & Lancaster, 2003). This belief can partly be attributed to the Index of Receptivity to Tobacco Industry Promotion (IRTIP) developed by Evans, Farkas, Gilpin, Berry, & Pierce (1995). IRTIP was later modified and used by Pierce, Choi, Gilpin, Farkas, & Berry (1998) in a longitudinal study that claimed to have found a causal link between advertising and adolescent cigarette trial. The model is advertised by the American National Cancer Institute (2004) as being able to measure the likelihood of an adolescent starting smoking. Because of Pierce’s causality claim and this endorsement, IRTIP has been widely adopted by tobacco-control researchers. Consequently, the results from IRTIP based surveys have played a central role in influencing tobacco control policy. Based on the logic that a model used to predict the chances of a non-smoker becoming a smoker should be able to distinguish between these two groups, discriminant analysis with dummy coded variables was used to validate IRTIP. The results show that while IRTIP classifies never-smokers well, it grossly misclassifies smokers. This leads to questions about the validity of the model and of studies using IRTIP.

Hearing; in the matter of the minimum wage recommendations of Special Industry Committee no. 17-D for the tobacco industry in Puerto Rico. September 6-8, 1955. Reporter: James A. Brownlee.

Mode of access: Internet.

A series of twelve Delft plates illustrating the tobacco industry,

At head of title: Board of education, South Kensington.

The devil is in the detail:tobacco industry political influence in the Dutch implementation of the 2001 EU Tobacco Products Directive

Introduction - The Dutch implementation of the black border provision in the 2001 European Union Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) is studied to examine the implications of tobacco industry involvement in the implementation phase of the policy process. Methods - A qualitative analysis was conducted of Dutch government documents obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests, triangulated with in-depth interviews with key informants and secondary data sources (publicly available government documents, scientific literature, and news articles). Results - Tobacco manufacturers’ associations were given the opportunity to set implementation specifications via a fast-track deal with the government. The offer of early implementation of the labelling section of the TPD was used as political leverage by the industry, and underpinned by threats of litigation and arguments highlighting the risks of additional public costs and the benefits to the government of expediency and speed. Ultimately, the government agreed to the industry's interpretation, against the advice of the European Commission. Conclusions - The findings highlight the policy risks associated with corporate actors’ ability to use interactions over technical product specifications to influence the implementation of health policy and illustrate the difficulties in limiting industry interference in accordance with Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). The implementation phase is particularly vulnerable to industry influence, where negotiation with industry actors may be unavoidable and the practical implications of relatively technical considerations are not always apparent to policymakers. During the implementation of the new TPD 2014/40/EU, government officials are advised to take a proactive role in stipulating technical specifications.

Exposing and addressing tobacco industry conduct in low-income and middle-income countries

The tobacco industry's future depends on increasing tobacco use in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs), which face a growing burden of tobacco-related disease, yet have potential to prevent full-scale escalation of this epidemic. To drive up sales the industry markets its products heavily, deliberately targeting non-smokers and keeps prices low until smoking and local economies are sufficiently established to drive prices and profits up. The industry systematically flaunts existing tobacco control legislation and works aggressively to prevent future policies using its resource advantage to present highly misleading economic arguments, rebrand political activities as corporate social responsibility, and establish and use third parties to make its arguments more palatable. Increasingly it is using domestic litigation and international arbitration to bully LMICs from implementing effective policies and hijacking the problem of tobacco smuggling for policy gain, attempting to put itself in control of an illegal trade in which there is overwhelming historical evidence of its complicity. Progress will not be realised until tobacco industry interference is actively addressed as outlined in Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Exemplar LMICs show this action can be achieved and indicate that exposing tobacco industry misconduct is an essential first step.

How does the tobacco industry attempt to influence marketing regulations? A systematic review

BACKGROUND: The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control makes a number of recommendations aimed at restricting the marketing of tobacco products. Tobacco industry political activity has been identified as an obstacle to Parties' development and implementation of these provisions. This study systematically reviews the existing literature on tobacco industry efforts to influence marketing regulations and develops taxonomies of 1) industry strategies and tactics and 2) industry frames and arguments. METHODS: Searches were conducted between April-July 2011, and updated in March 2013. Articles were included if they made reference to tobacco industry efforts to influence marketing regulations; supported claims with verifiable evidence; were written in English; and concerned the period 1990-2013. 48 articles met the review criteria. Narrative synthesis was used to combine the evidence. RESULTS: 56% of articles focused on activity in North America, Europe or Australasia, the rest focusing on Asia (17%), South America, Africa or transnational activity. Six main political strategies and four main frames were identified. The tobacco industry frequently claims that the proposed policy will have negative unintended consequences, that there are legal barriers to regulation, and that the regulation is unnecessary because, for example, industry does not market to youth or adheres to a voluntary code. The industry primarily conveys these arguments through direct and indirect lobbying, the promotion of voluntary codes and alternative policies, and the formation of alliances with other industrial sectors. The majority of tactics and arguments were used in multiple jurisdictions. CONCLUSIONS: Tobacco industry political activity is far more diverse than suggested by existing taxonomies of corporate political activity. Tactics and arguments are repeated across jurisdictions, suggesting that the taxonomies of industry tactics and arguments developed in this paper are generalisable to multiple jurisdictions and can be used to predict industry activity.

Representation and misrepresentation of scientific evidence in contemporary tobacco regulation:a review of tobacco industry submissions to the UK Government consultation on standardised packaging

BACKGROUND: Standardised packaging (SP) of tobacco products is an innovative tobacco control measure opposed by transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) whose responses to the UK government's public consultation on SP argued that evidence was inadequate to support implementing the measure. The government's initial decision, announced 11 months after the consultation closed, was to wait for 'more evidence', but four months later a second 'independent review' was launched. In view of the centrality of evidence to debates over SP and TTCs' history of denying harms and manufacturing uncertainty about scientific evidence, we analysed their submissions to examine how they used evidence to oppose SP. METHODS AND FINDINGS: We purposively selected and analysed two TTC submissions using a verification-oriented cross-documentary method to ascertain how published studies were used and interpretive analysis with a constructivist grounded theory approach to examine the conceptual significance of TTC critiques. The companies' overall argument was that the SP evidence base was seriously flawed and did not warrant the introduction of SP. However, this argument was underpinned by three complementary techniques that misrepresented the evidence base. First, published studies were repeatedly misquoted, distorting the main messages. Second, 'mimicked scientific critique' was used to undermine evidence; this form of critique insisted on methodological perfection, rejected methodological pluralism, adopted a litigation (not scientific) model, and was not rigorous. Third, TTCs engaged in 'evidential landscaping', promoting a parallel evidence base to deflect attention from SP and excluding company-held evidence relevant to SP. The study's sample was limited to sub-sections of two out of four submissions, but leaked industry documents suggest at least one other company used a similar approach. CONCLUSIONS: The TTCs' claim that SP will not lead to public health benefits is largely without foundation. The tools of Better Regulation, particularly stakeholder consultation, provide an opportunity for highly resourced corporations to slow, weaken, or prevent public health policies.

A critical evaluation of the volume, relevance and quality of evidence submitted by the tobacco industry to oppose standardised packaging of tobacco products

OBJECTIVES: To examine the volume, relevance and quality of transnational tobacco corporations' (TTCs) evidence that standardised packaging of tobacco products 'won't work', following the UK government's decision to 'wait and see' until further evidence is available. DESIGN: Content analysis. SETTING: We analysed the evidence cited in submissions by the UK's four largest TTCs to the UK Department of Health consultation on standardised packaging in 2012. OUTCOME MEASURES: The volume, relevance (subject matter) and quality (as measured by independence from industry and peer-review) of evidence cited by TTCs was compared with evidence from a systematic review of standardised packaging . Fisher's exact test was used to assess differences in the quality of TTC and systematic review evidence. 100% of the data were second-coded to validate the findings: 94.7% intercoder reliability; all differences were resolved. RESULTS: 77/143 pieces of TTC-cited evidence were used to promote their claim that standardised packaging 'won't work'. Of these, just 17/77 addressed standardised packaging: 14 were industry connected and none were published in peer-reviewed journals. Comparison of TTC and systematic review evidence on standardised packaging showed that the industry evidence was of significantly lower quality in terms of tobacco industry connections and peer-review (p<0.0001). The most relevant TTC evidence (on standardised packaging or packaging generally, n=26) was of significantly lower quality (p<0.0001) than the least relevant (on other topics, n=51). Across the dataset, TTC-connected evidence was significantly less likely to be published in a peer-reviewed journal (p=0.0045). CONCLUSIONS: With few exceptions, evidence cited by TTCs to promote their claim that standardised packaging 'won't work' lacks either policy relevance or key indicators of quality. Policymakers could use these three criteria-subject matter, independence and peer-review status-to critically assess evidence submitted to them by corporate interests via Better Regulation processes.

International trade law, plain packaging and tobacco industry political activity:the Trans-Pacific Partnership

Tobacco companies are increasingly turning to trade and investment agreements to challenge measures aimed at reducing tobacco use. This study examines their efforts to influence the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a major trade and investment agreement which may eventually cover 40% of the world's population; focusing on how these efforts might enhance the industry's power to challenge the introduction of plain packaging. Specifically, the paper discusses the implications for public health regulation of Philip Morris International's interest in using the TPP to: shape the bureaucratic structures and decision-making processes of business regulation at the national level; introduce a higher standard of protection for trademarks than is currently provided under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; and expand the coverage of Investor-State Dispute Settlement which empowers corporations to litigate directly against governments where they are deemed to be in breach of investment agreements. The large number of countries involved in the TPP underlines its risk to the development of tobacco regulation globally.

Regulation as country-specific (dis-)advantage:smoking bans and the location of foreign direct investment in the tobacco industry

This paper seeks to examine the relationship between smoking bans and the propensity of tobacco firms to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). Using international business theory based on the firm-specific advantage/country-specific advantage (FSA/CSA) matrix, the authors show that, contrary to what one may expect, smoking bans at home are an important institutional intervention, reducing the propensity for firms to engage in FDI, even to countries without a ban themselves.